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The roots of e
Egypt in the aftermath of the 25th 
revolution 
 
by Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim*
 
Introduction 
 
Since the 25
th
 of January, 2011 revolution the Egyptian economy has been suffering on all 
fronts. Almost all the economic indicators have been pointing towards a deteriorating situation, 
that in many cases have reached the trough. Y
indicators have been pointing towards a near collapse. This is mainly due to the unprecedented 
support of some of Arab Gulf countries, whom their unconditional support has helped to 
mitigate the deteriorating economic conditions.  
 
The economic challenges facing in Egypt have exacerbated
mainly because of the deteriorating political and security conditions which have interrupted the 
functioning of the economy. Yet, this is
fact the challenges that the Egyptian economy has been facing have deep roots in the socio
political-economic context, which this paper aims at explaining. The revolution and its 
aftermath have brought to the forefront such challenges which have been always mitigated by 
short term solutions that never dealt seriously with the roots. In addition, the revolution has 
brought additional problems associated with the macroeconomic imbalances. As a result,
challenges became more complex especially in light of the need to balance the social and 
economic aspects.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows; in section one we pinpoint the main challenges faced by Egypt 
where we identify the symptoms and causes of such
roots of such challenges. Finally, we conclude and provide our understanding of how is it 
expected that Egypt will face its challenges in the near future
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et, the economy is still surviving, even if all 
 
 after the 25th
 not to say that revolution has caused such challenges. In 
 challenges. In section two we discuss the 
 
 
4 
acing 
 of January revolution 
-
 the 
 Section One: Challenges Facing the Egyptian Economy
Despite the deeply rooted economic problems, the former 25
keep the macroeconomic balances under control. Over the period 2004
economy has just been doing perfect where growth rate exceeded in some years the 7%,
budget deficit was in the range of 8
turned into a surplus, and foreign exchange reserves were increasing. Moreover, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) has reached unprecedented levels (13 billion US$).
appraised by international organizations for its remarkable good economic performance, which 
according to their standards has been improving over time. For example, Egypt, was accounted 
for as the “top reformer” in 2006/2007 by 
the 10 areas studied by Doing Business
reflected in improving the socio economic indicators, where the level of poverty remained high 
and income distribution did no
of January revolution focused mainly on the economic aspects while leaving the social aspect 
relatively untouched.  Poverty in Egypt has remained high and vulnerable to changes in GDP 
growth rates. By February 2009, it was estimated that almost 21% of the population 
(approximately 13.5 million) was below the national poverty line (120 LE per capita per 
month)
2
. The situation did not change much since the early 1990s where at that time 24% of 
the population fell below the national poverty line
poverty situation improved in 2008 compared to 2004/2005 as reflected in the incidence of 
poverty whereas the poverty gap slightly increased as well as the severity o
aftermath of the 25
th
 of January revolution, poverty levels have increased significantly, mainly 
due to the dramatic slow-down in growth rates, significant increase in unemployment rates, 
and unstable political situation
Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) data Egypt's poverty increased to encompass 25.2 % of 
the population in 2010/2011 compared to 21.6% in 2008/2009, also “extreme” poverty had 
decreased to 4.8% of the population in 20
according to the poverty line in Egypt, which is estimated at LE 256 per person per month, or 
LE8.5 per day, while the "extreme" poverty line is calculated at LE 171.5 pounds per person per 
month or LE5.7 per day
5
. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 World Bank (2008), Doing Business 2008, 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global
2
 World Bank (2009) puts the figure of poor in Egypt at 28 million people in 2005 representing 40% of the 
population. World Bank (2009) considers 13.6 million (19.6%) in absolute poverty or ultra
than the minimum to cover their basic food 
million (21%) in near poverty (spending between LE 1424 and 1854 per year per capita).
3
 UNDP (2010), ‘Egypt Human Development Report 2010’, Available at: 
http://www.undp.org.eg/Portals/0/NHDR%202010%20english.pdf
4
 World Bank (2009), ‘Economic Growth, Ineq
2008’, Report No. 48093, Washington D.C.: World Bank.
5
 Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), News, Press Release, 2012, available at: 
http://capmas.gov.eg/pepo/281.pdf
 
th
 of January regime was able to 
-10% and was heavily controlled, balance of payments was 
Doing Business Report (2008)
1. Yet, such good economic performance was not 
t improve. In other words, the governing regime before the 25
3, yet, according to World Bank (2009)
 (table 1). According to the Central Agency for Public 
10/2011 from 6.1% in 2008/2009. These figures are 
The World Bank, Washington D.C.., Availab
-reports/doing-business-2008/  
requirements or less than LE 1423 per year per capita) and 14.5 
. 
uality, and Poverty: Social Mobility in Egypt between 2005 and 
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f poverty. In the 
le online at: 
-poverty (spending 
 
 Table 1: Poverty Rate in Different Years
 
Poverty headcount ratio at national 
poverty line  
(% of population) 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2014, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=worl
d-development-indicators 
 
The 25
th
 of January revolution pointed out the need to pay attention to social dimension which 
was neglected to a large extent by the former regime. The slog
“bread, freedom, and social justice”. Hence, the different regimes that f
revolution have leaned towards achieving the social goals, in many cases at the expense of the 
economic stability. As a result, the challenges exacerbated, where the conflict between 
achieving social goals and economic objectives became so te
challenges have been solved. The macroeconomic indicators have been deteriorating where 
aftermath of the revolution has clearly negatively affected the economy as has been revealed 
by the deteriorating economic indicators 
down from 5.9% in 2009/2010 to 1.9% in 2010/2011 (CBE, 2011)
reached higher alarming rates
2009/2010 to 2.2 billion US $ in 2010/2011 with a negative growth rate of 67%
Table 2: Selected Economic Indicators for Egypt over the Period 2008
Indicator 
GDP growth (annual %) 
Current account balance (% of GDP)
Total reserves in months of imports
Total Unemployment (% of total 
labor force) 
State Budget Cash Deficit (% of GDP)
Total reserves (% of total external 
debt) 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, available online at: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=worl
d-development-indicators 
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 CBE Annual Report (2010/2011), 
 
 
2000 2005 2008 2009
16.7 19.6 - 21.6
available online at: 
an of the revolution has been 
nsed, and in fact none of the 
(slowdown of the economy where growth rate went 
6
 (table 2)
 (figure 1), and net FDI inflows went down from 6.6 billion US $ in 
Egypt 
2008 2009 2010 2011 
7.2 4.7 5.1 1.8 
 -0.9 -1.8 -2.1 -2.4 
 6.0 7.4 6.7 3.3 
8.7 9.4 9.0 12 
 -6.4 -6.6 -7.7 -10.1 
102.5 99.8 101.7 53.2 
 18.3 11.8 11.3 10.1 
 
http://www.cbe.org.eg/public/AnnualRepot2011.pdf 
 
6 
 2011 
 25.2 
 
ollowed after the 
the 
, unemployment 
 (figure 2).   
-2011 
 Figure 1: Unemployment Rate (%)
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF),  World Economic Outlook Database, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/index.asp
 
Figure 2: Foreign Direct Investment
Source: Central Bank of Egypt, Research and Publications, Time Series, 
http://www.cbe.org.eg/English/Ec
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 The 2010/2011 deficit in balance of payments reached unprecedented heights scoring 9.8 
billion US $ (4.1% of GDP) compared to a surplus of 3.4 billion 
whereas international reserves slipped down from 36 billion US dollars in January 2011 
(covering more than 8 month of imports) to 16 billion US dollars in January 2012 (covering less 
than 4 months of imports) (see figures 3
prospects for the future are worrisome due to worsening security situation. The credit rating 
for Egypt by major rating agencies has deteriorated several times since the beginning of the 
revolution causing additional problems with the ability of Egypt to borrow from abroad and its 
credit worthiness. As a result, the interest rate on treasury bills increased by almost 2 
percentage points making it more burdensome for the government to borrow. The governmen
overall
7
 budget deficit reached high records of 142 billion Egyptian pounds (23 billion US $), 
representing around 10% of GDP, and not including foreign and domestic debt service which 
reached 99 billion US $. The budget deficit soared to almost 14% of G
been declining significantly, black market in foreign exchange appeared despite devaluation 
taking place, balance of payments turned from surplus to deficit, etc. The 
extremely gloomy. Figures 1 and 2 show how 
deteriorated significantly. 
 
Figure 3: Balance of Payments
US Billion 
Source: Central Bank of Egypt, Research and Publications, Time Series, 
http://www.cbe.org.eg/English/Economic+Research/Time+Series
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 Figure 4: Net International 
Source: Central Bank of Egypt, Publications, Statistical Bulletin, January 2014. 
http://cbe.org.eg/CBE_Bulletin/2014/Bu
al_Reserves_with_CBE.pdf 
 
The balance of payments problems hinge mainly on declining foreign exchange receipts of 
tourism, exports and, FDI. Other sources of foreign exchange as remittances and Suez Canal 
revenues have maintained their levels and ev
scarcity of foreign exchange has had a negative impact on the exchange rate (figure 5). 
However, the devaluation that took place in December 2012 was not substantial
figure 5. Currently, there is a small black market premium which does not exceed 5%, signaling  
that the Central Bank, so far, is in control of managing the exchange rate, mainly with the 
support of the Gulf countries which reached around 17 bi
till May 1
st
, 2014. 
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 as show in 
st
 2013 
17.0
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 Figure 5: Exchange Rate 
Official exchange rate (Egyptian Pound 
Source: Central Bank of Egypt, Research and Publications, Time Series, 
http://www.cbe.org.eg/English/Economic+Research/Time+Series
 
 
The deteriorating economic conditions have exacerbated the unemployment problem with 
official figures stating the unemployment level to have reached 13%. Despite the relatively high 
figure we believe it is underestimated due 
government for additional waves of job seekers after the 25
 
The two major economic challenges faced by the Egyptian economy (before and after the 
revolution) remain two: subsidies refo
 
Subsidies seem to be the major challenge that any governing regime in Egypt has failed to 
tackle. In fact, subsidies have always represented the symbol of the social contract between the 
governing regime and the population. Any trial 
and none of the preceding regimes for the last 60 years was able to implement serious reform 
measures. Rather, a piecemeal approach (often manipulated in a way or another) was always 
used if it was really urgent and pressing to undertake adjustments to the subsidies system.  
Otherwise, and as long as the system can be sustained, even if at extremely high economic cost 
full of inefficiency and waste of resources, no reform took place.
 
The main cause behind the budget deficit deterioration 
expenditure on increasing public wages (as a response to the demonstrations
subsidies (table 3). 
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Figure 6: Government Budget
Source: Ministry of Finance, State's General Budget Final Accounts, 
http://www.mof.gov.eg/English/Pages/FinalAccountsData.aspx
 
Table 3: Distribution of Government Expenditures (%)
 
2005/2006 2006/2007
• Compensations of  
Employees 
22.5 
Salaries and wages 18.1 
• Purchases of Goods  
• and Services 
6.9 
• Interests 17.7 
• Subsidies, Grants  
• and Social Benefits 
33.2 
    Subsidies 26.1 
   To Petroleum 20.1 
    Grants 1.0 
    Social Benefits 5.9 
    Other 0.1 
• Other Expenditures 9.5 
• Purchases of Non-
Financial 
•  Assets  (Investments) 
10.2 
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 2011/2012 2012/2013 
24.0 26.1 24.3 
19.5 21.2 20.1 
6.5 5.7 4.5 
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 Source: Calculated using data from Central Bank of Egypt, Research and Publications, Time Series, 
http://www.cbe.org.eg/English/Economic+Research/Time+Series/
Energy subsidies comprise a significant share of government expenditure in Egypt. In 
2012/2013, petroleum subsidies reache
GDP, 17% of total government expenditure, and 25.4% of total government revenues. 
Petroleum subsidies increased from L.E 1.2 billion in 1998/1999 to LE 100 billion in the 
2012/2013 (figure 7) : 
 
Figure 7:  Value of Petroleum Subsidies in Egypt (billion Egyptian Pounds)
Source: Ministry of Finance, Closing Accounts of State Budget, Several Years.
 
The unemployment rate in Egypt increased significantly over the 1990s. The high average 
unemployment rate continued to prevail in the 2000s. Moreover, unemployment rates 
increased further after the revolution. The highest unemployment rates have been 
concentrated among youth as well as females. 
reached about 27.2 million by end of the 1
800,000 new entrants to the labor market on yearly basis) requiring at 
6.5-7% on annual basis for at least two decades (Ikram, 2006)
educational and employment policies, among other macroeconomic policies such huge labor 
force has not been effectively used. In the last tw
sectors including telecommunications, financial, real estate sectors which have not been 
necessarily employment enhancing. Manufacturing sectors with high value added did not play 
an effective role in enhancing g
the structural problems of the Egyptian economy, where unemployment remained chronic. The 
concentration of the unemployment among youth is another major challenge (22% for age 
                                                          
8
 Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) (2013) la
Webpage: http://www.capmas.gov.eg/pepo/403_e.pdf
9
 Ikram, Khalid (2006), The Egyptian Economy, 1952
York: Routledge 
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 quarter (January-march) for year 2013
least a rate of growth of 
9
. However due to inefficient 
o decades the growth was driven by specific 
rowth.  The governmental policies adopted failed to deal with 
bor force survey results, Press Release, 
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which 
8
. There are 
67.7
95.5 100
 bracket 25-29 and 44% for age bracket 20
has not been utilized and has acted a burden rather than an opportunity. Public sector 
employment, and informal sector helped to alleviate the features of the problem, yet the core 
remained un-tackled. The aftermath of the Arab uprising has led to exacerbate the 
unemployment problem where the average rate of unemployment rose to 13% up from an 
average of 9.9% for the decade before 2011. 
 
Moreover, youth unemployment does not improve
education and has been hitting all skill levels. Even highly skilled young workers have been 
facing severe challenges in getting a job at their competence level and have been either forced 
into the informal economy, migrating, or preferring not to join the labour market
 
The negative consequences of the unemployment problem in terms of proliferation of the 
informal sector and being correlated with higher poverty rates implied socio
political repercussions, especially in light of the old social contract that confirmed that creating 
jobs is a main role for the governing regimes. As a result, and especially in the last few years 
protests increased dramatically. In 2008 Egypt has witnessed around 323 prote
which spanned a wide social spectrum. It is worth noting that most of these protes
within blue collar circles
12
. Such protests revealed the anger of the unemployed as well as the 
employed but not feeling secure and/or asking for
social contract, and the inability of the governing regimes in responding to the needs of their 
population. 
 
In fact the unemployment problem in Egypt has a number of causes on both the supply and 
demand sides. On the supply side, the major problems are associated with the deteriorated 
level of education, the mismatch between education systems outcomes and labour market 
requirements, and the inflexible labour market policies and regulations. On the demand side,
the investment and industrial policies adopted were not geared to create job opportunities, 
and this is highly associated with the inefficient energy subsidy scheme which create
incentives encouraging energy and capital intensive industries, rather
There are other several challenges that are related to the main two challenges and include the 
two chronic deficits in the last three decades, namely 
                                                          
10
 African Development Bank (ADB) (2013), Egypt Economic Quarterly Review, Volume 3, April 2013, Egypt Country 
Office, Webpage: 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Egypt%20Economic%20Quarterly%20Re
view%20-%20Volume%203%20-%20April%202013.pdf
11
 International Labour Organization (ILO) (2013), Global Employment Trends 2013: Recovering from a Second 
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 of GDP in 1990/1991, 10.2% in 
payment deficit which was about 0.9 billion dollars in 2000/2001 reaching 11.3 billion dollars in 
2011/2012 representing 0.9% and 4.4% of GDP in the previously mentioned years 
respectively
14
. Moreover, the domestic component of the overall national debt remains a major 
concern where it has represented on average 83.5% of the total 
end of December 2012
15
.  
 
In the mid 2000s the macroeconomic policies adopted aimed mainly at
macroeconomic imbalances. Yet, the inability to tackle the inefficient energy subsidy system led 
to worsening fiscal situation. Moreover, the inefficient food subsidy system has also added to 
the fiscal problems. The economic developments fo
revolution have been significant. The balance of payments turned from a surplus of 3.4 billion 
US $ in the fiscal year 2009/2010 to a deficit of 9.8 billion US $ in 2010/2011.The rise of the 
external debt is a new challenge that appeared in the period following the Presidential 
elections of 2012 where external debt rose sharply in this year to reach around 40 billion US $ 
in December, 2012. However, in relative terms the external debt remained in the range of 
13.8% of GDP by end of December 2012
domestic debt has been increasing significantly.
 
The improvement of the socio economic situation
explained above the growth perfor
failed to create sufficient jobs to match the rapid increase in the labor force of 2.7% per year.
The proliferation of the informal sector has created another type of political and social 
problems to the government. The current predominance of the informal sector gives a wrong 
impression on the improvement of employment prospects, where in reality the jobs remain 
unproductive and do not have a positive impact on economic growth. Based on recent 
estimates, the informal economy has reached remarkable proportion in Egypt representing on 
average 34.9% between 1999 and 2006/2007
outlet for reducing the official unemployment rates, but in fact has been hiding d
unemployment.  
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 Section Two: Explaining the Roots of Economic Challenges:
Achieving decent growth rates, accumulating foreign reserves, lessening budget deficits, 
turning balance of payments from deficits to surpluses, and controlling inflation did
full story of success of the pre 25
proliferating before the 25
th
 of January revolution. Such problems have not been new, but were 
either neglected or overlooked by both the governing 
community. We can identify three main problems in this regard, namely unemployment; lack of 
or inefficient social safety net; and anti
crony capitalism. From a political 
interrelated. Moreover, the developmental model adopted by Egypt since the 1960s has been 
also a major culprit for causing the economic problems. A model was established by relying 
heavily on the government intervention in the economy with social contracts established 
between the governing autocratic regimes and the society where the government is 
responsible for making jobs, subsidized food, and cheap fuel available in return of stability and 
security18. By time, and starting the 1990s when the economic situation worsened, there was a 
need for economic reform, which was implemented jointly with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The reform program was based on “Washington Con
type of prescription and the governing regime started to undertake measures to liberalize the 
economy. But such measures failed to allow the private sector to become an engine of growth 
due to the inheritance of bureaucracy, rent seeking activities
started to suffer from several structural problems associated with the inefficiency of its 
economy, lack of diversification, and inability to create the type of growth that ensures 
employment generation. As a result, un
other economic problems started to intensify.  
Below we highlight a number of aspects that explain the aforementioned challenges
 
Inefficient Social Safety Nets 
The governing regimes starting the 1960s have provided untargeted subsidies for the 
population.The subsidies encompassed food as well as energy. At early times in the 1960s and 
the 1970s such untargeted subsidies could have been tolerated due to the relati
of the population and the relative closed nature of Egypt at that time which enabled the regime 
to be shielded from exogenous shocks. With the adoption of the economic reform programs in 
the 1990s the focus of the regimes turned to econom
considerations were left behind. International organizations have devoted more attention to 
getting macroeconomic balances right, while issues of efficiency of social safety net were not 
high on the agenda. The governing regi
avoided any kind of substantial reform of their social safety nets fearing from the negative 
political and social repercussions. The informal sector acted as a substitute for the formal social 
safety net that should have been provided by the governing regimes. This allowed the 
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 governing regimes to undertake their necessary economic reform measures while ensuring that 
there will be no social unrest. 
 
However, by time the bill of subsidies increased dramati
countries. Fuel subsidies amounted to around L.E 95.5 billion in 2011/12, compared to L.E 60.2 
billion in 2007/08, recording more than 58.6 percent increase (Ministry of Finance, Final 
Accounts). The same has been true in
percent increase over the same period, rising from L.E 16.4 billion to L.E 30.3 billion. This 
implies that fuel and food subsidies represented more than 20 percent and 6 percent of total 
budget expenditure in 2011/12
quality of public services started to deteriorate dramatically, an issue which has not been easily 
captured by data published as number of beds in hospitals per thousand persons
expenditure on health. Such indicators have been misleading where as the number of beds 
might have been within the acceptable international norms, the quality aspect was never 
captured. The same is true for the public expenditure on health and educatio
figures do not reveal the expenditure outlays, which in many cases have been channeled to 
finance administrative staff and not technical staff or investments.  The proliferation of the 
informal sector acted again as a substitute here and it c
corruption, which increased significantly, signaling huge inefficiency of the social public services 
provided by the government and announcing the breaking of the old social contract. 
Hence the inefficiency of the social safety net which was not an important issue till the 1990s 
started to become a major problem after embarking on economic reforms in the 1990s. By 
time, the inefficiency of the social safety net intensified and the resources devoted to provision 
of public social services did not help to improve the quality of such services or reach the needy 
people. The informal sector and petty corruption provided a substitute for such inefficient 
social safety net. 
 
Lack of Institutions Necessary to Govern the Mar
The governing regimes neglected the necessity of establishing the right institutions that govern 
the market (e.g. competition and consumer protection laws), or introduced weak laws which 
remained on shelf with no enforcement or discretionary one. In fa
program adopted in the 1990s did not focus on this important aspect, where the emphasis has 
been on economic policies as explained above. By time, a new variable emerged, namely the 
desire of the governing dictators to be succeeded 
governing regimes increased their dubious ties with the certain elements of the private sector 
to act as a strong lobby for them remaining in power. This led to conflict of interest and grand 
corruption, but served to sustain the necessary political support for the regimes (by creating 
beneficiaries from the succession procedure). Major private sector players started to hold 
legislative and executive positions, which in a country suffering from clear rules on conflic
interest implied wrong marriage between political power and capital. This led to the 
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 phenomena of crony capitalism and nepotism, and ultimately led to delay of establishing the 
institutions or having them only on paper. The income gaps widened dramati
although not highly captured by formal indicators, the overall feeling of 
increased among the public. 
 
The end result of those economic problems was an increasing loss of trust in the regimes 
among different segments of the population and discontent that the old social contract was no 
longer respected, especially in light of the high unemployment rates amon
mixture of anger about the political, economic, and social conditions triggered by the domino 
effect of developments in other Arab countries, together with an inability to handle the 
protests and demonstrations then ultimately led to the re
What Needs to be Done: Prospects for the Future
Ensuring a long term positive correlation between growth and employment
a number of sectors, and coordination among several policies. There is a need for 
reforms in the educational system, employment policy and institutional infrastructure to ensure 
that economic growth yields positive impact on employment, unemployment, and poverty. 
There is a need for better coordination among different macroeconomi
policies. Investment policy needs to be tailored in a way that enhance growth of sectors with 
high propensity of generating employment, and a well effective formal social safety net is 
needed to be designed and implemented. Agricult
employment in the economy (absorbing one third of labor force), but has remained weak in 
generating higher value added.
 
Enhancing forward and backward linkages
telecommunications sector), being capital intensive, cannot be altered. However, this does not 
imply that they cannot play a role in enhancing employment. In fact their role in increasing 
labor productivity and the backward and forward linkages they attain with
economy should be used in a way to enhance employment in sectors that are labor intensive.
 
Rationalization of the generous subsidy system: 
important role in acting as a social safety net. In fac
food and energy products, has been heavily criticized of being inefficient and lack targeting (in 
1992, 86% of the population continued to benefit from subsidy programs). The generous 
subsidy system played an impor
phenomenon that affected all sectors of the economy in the 1990s. Yet the generous subsidies 
are being yet rationed due to the high burden they impose on the government budget. 
Improving the status of vulnerable groups
the framework of the social safety net. 
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 Enabling the private sector: 
environment that help it to act as the main engine o
sector as percentage of GDP increased over time. However, the existing indicators show that 
business environment remains suffering from a number of problems that prevent it from acting 
as a catalyst of growth and development. Problems include lack of efficient public services, to 
red tape measures, to rent seeking activities. 
its existing schemes should be reformed, 
economy were lately introduced including the competition law in 2005 and consumer 
protection law in 2006. 
 
Enhancing the role of SMEs 
sectors that enjoy high growth rate but are not necessarily
for 80 % of Egypt’s domestic economy and 75% of the private sector’s labor force are another 
unutilized driver of growth
21
. Such huge production capacity remains suffering from red tape 
measures, high transaction costs and bureaucracy which have derived SMEs into the informal 
sector. Moreover, the SMEs have not been integrated in the value chain where they do not 
interact with large enterprises. SMEs cannot be dealt with as one entity as their needs differ by 
sector. SMEs are in need of a holistic vision, but as well sectoral policies. 
should be further enhanced to undertake their role in creating productive emp
their significant contribution to Egypt’s economy, SMEs receive only 10 percent of available 
banking finance, making it difficult to increase their productivity and output
there is an urgent need to upgrade the labor skil
training programs that respond to the need of the market.  This requires the adoption of 
demand and supply side policies including labor, investment, industrial, and trade policies.
 
 
The question that then follows is to what extent are such ills of economics and governance likely 
to be solved in the near future?
The old regimes might have achieved sound macroeconomic indicators, yet in reality it had 
several pitfalls. Some have blamed the failure due to adoptio
reality the regime did not opt for one. On the contrary, the failure is due to its inability to 
implement a proper free market system and prepare well to benefit from integration. As shown 
by Ikram (2006) the size of the publ
announcement of adoption of liberal policies starting the 1970s where the size of public sector 
to GDP reached 50% in the 1980s. A market system implies by default a larger role for the 
government on two fronts, namely social safety net, and proper, well
govern the market (strong institutions). In both cases, there was a clear government failure in 
creating an efficient social safety net as well establishing a transparent well en
system that governs the market. The end result was corruption, widening gaps between income 
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 levels, and lack of justice23. But this is not because of adoption of free market system and 
integration in the world economy, rather it is because
needed pre-conditions for a market economy and integration in the world economy to function 
properly.  
 
Egypt is at crossroads, not only from a political point of view, but also on economic and social 
grounds. The 25
th
 of January revolution and its aftermath have shocked the Egyptian society. 
The day to day incidents have shown huge divergence and clear segmentation among the 
Egyptians, an issue that was neither revealed to that extent before the revolution nor was
expected to be to that extreme after the revolution. The 25
explicitly and implicitly economic reasons. The failure of the old regime in providing a descent 
life for the majority of the population, while at the same time s
to extremely high levels of dissatisfaction among the population, and especially the youth. The 
youth went out asking for "bread", "freedom", and "social equity". Those three important 
aspects of a descent life were not pro
political power or party, regardless of its economic ideology or religious roots, will need to 
highlight such aspects in its election program in order to fulfill the revolution demands. Such 
aspects are translated on the ground in the form of creation of jobs, fighting corruption, 
overcoming unemployment, and ensuring social equity.
 
However, on the ground, there is still a need to create a vision on how the economic system 
should look like? What are t
religious groups competing for the parliament's membership. Such a crucial aspect of the future 
of Egypt has been largely neglected by the political powers, yet it is expected to gain attenti
in the remaining phase of the transitional period and afterwards.
 
Bearing in mind the factors discussed above such as the problem of the social contract, the 
model of development adopted, as well as the worsening economic indicators in the last two 
years, it seems unlikely that the economic conditions will change in the 
because of the structural nature of such problems, political turbulence, and weak economic 
management from the current governing regimes economic problems are likely to be further 
intensified. The governance challenges are also un
change likely to happen is the removal of the old private sector tycoons who were heavily 
engaged with the old regime. But this does not necessarily imply a more conducive business 
environment. The large vacuum le
to be filled and filled quickly. The new regimes, in light of worsening economic conditions, 
might be forced to revert to something similar, either foreign or domestic, but not necessarily 
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 more efficient. A recent study (Saif and Ghoneim, 2013)
Egypt is having several problems in its ability to function. Among the problems that Saif and 
Ghoneim (2013) identified has been the lack of political and economic vi
security status, inability to determine how policy making and decisions are being made in the 
new regime, frequent change of cabinets, and change of several senior government officials 
who have been aware of how to deal with business co
 
Keeping aside the ideological political debates between different parties, what alternative do 
we have from an economic point of view? The answer is a modified free market system, that 
builds on the past but fixes its problems associated
decisions. Advocates of a new system (and they are many) argue that the free market system of 
the old regime is the culprit for all Egyptian ills and call for more government involvement. But 
they never identified what is meant by that, putting in mind that free market advocates also 
argue for more government involvement. Sometimes they refer to more involvement of the 
government in production of goods and services (to balance the monopolistic and oligopolistic 
abuse of power by private players), and sometimes they call for better regulations. The scene is 
not clear, and it seems that all are aiming at the same thing but calling it differently.
In other words, the transitional period that Egypt is passing by has proven
difficult that is causing severe economic hardships. 
 
Finally, it is unlikely that there will be a clear economic system that is able to characterize 
Egypt's economic regime. The socialist elements rooted in the economic system are likely
remain for a while. Any regime that governs will be extra cautious with embarking on any type 
of major market oriented leapfrog. Moreover, the sensitivity of the transitional period and the 
period that will follow to social unrest will imply continuing
that is not sustainable from an economic point of view. Hence, what is expected is a piece meal 
market oriented reform to avoid social and political unrest. This does not imply that there is a 
tendency to invoke socialist ideas, it is rather a matter of fear from social and/or political unrest 
if major reforms are undertaken. This has been reflected in the initiatives announced by the 
government over the last three years where such initiatives focused on objectives witho
identifying means. This remain close to a wish list of mentioning issues like high sustainable 
growth rate, increasing GDP per capita, reform of subsidies, etc. But how to achieve such 
objectives was not clearly identified. To conclude, Egypt’s economic
are well known. Remedies are also clearly identified, but what lacks is the conducive political 
economy context that enables the governing regime to start the reforms. Given the political 
economy context Egypt is passing by right n
reform is adopted, it is rather likely to remain a piece meal approach. To be able to achieve 
significant economic reforms there is a need for building the socio political constituency to 
undertake the reforms, which is so far still not there.
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